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COME NOW the Defendant/Appellant Herold I,, Gregory, Trustee, 
for and on behal.t. cr: ;.oe Marita. ami \ rustt I tin; AIIM-I'I 
Eccles Family Trus- Hereinafter "Defendant/Appellant Gregory", 
"Defendant Gregc.-. ' •. • "Gregory") by and through his attorney, 
Jef f rey K. Woodbury, and Defendants /Appellants Dean and Chri s I :I 
Bradshaw (hereinafter "Defendants/Appellants Bradshaw" , "Defendants 
Brads haw ai id or Bradshaw" ) ai id joint J y petit i on tl :i I s Court iui a 
rehearing on the issues involved in the appeal of this matter. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court having entered its opinion In this matter, the 
Appellants jointly believe that the Court has overlooked and/or 
misunderstood several material facts and points oi l.iw . >* 
important to this case, ~*r- th^ consideration of which warrants a 
rehea. * > |.->n I '-• '>etiti on i .s submitted pursuant to 
Rule 3ht utan Rules of Appellate Procedure {1990) for the purposes 
of requesting a rehearing to clarify those facts and points of law 
for the Court, 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The find i ji-.j." .: the Court of Appeals lhal: fjf'reage W H S mot 
important to this transaction is inconsistent with the trial 
Court's finding that it was the acreage that was important because 
it was the very basis upon which the property was d I M ided I i 1 to two 
parcels. Gregorys made their decision t iivide the property into 
two parcel s based oi i 1: hei i: irel i ai i< erroneous survey. 
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Grahns understood that and all parties relied on the survey and on 
the resulting misplacement of the survey stakes. Gregory would not 
have divided the property had they known about the mistake and they 
would have never made the contract to sell parcel one separately to 
Grahns. Where the parties negotiated their contract while under 
mistaken assumptions which, if known, would have prevented the 
contract from being made, the injured party is entitled to the 
remedy rescission of the contract, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS MADE A NEW FINDING OF FACT, 
INCONSISTENT WITH THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT, 
THAT THE ACREAGE WAS NOT IMPORTANT TO THIS TRANSACTION 
This Court appears to have made a new finding of fact, 
inconsistent with the findings of the trial court, that acreage was 
not important to this transaction. The new finding justifies a 
reformation decision. This Court found that Appellants did not 
carry their burden of proof before the Court of Appeals, but in 
fact, Appellants did carry their burden of proof in the trial 
court. 
The trial court is the finder of fact, and it is not the 
function of the appellate court to make findings of fact because it 
does not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses 
testify. Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979). The trial 
court has the benefit of hearing testimony in open court and 
weighing the evidence at the same time and in the light that it is 
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presented. Moreover, in this case, the trial court visited and 
viewed the subject property. The trial court is therefore in a 
better position to know and understand the facts of the case. In 
an equity case the appellate court may weigh facts as well as 
review the law, but it may reverse on the facts only when the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of the trial 
court. Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). 
The trial court found: 
13. The description to Parcel One was obtained by 
plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt Lake County Recorders 
Office. The description designated Parcel One as being 
1.11 acres and accepted by the trustee and defendants 
Grahn as acreage to be sold and purchased. 
The trial court based this finding on complicated testimony 
from many sources. The initial earnest money upon which 
negotiations were based referred only to the acre and one half acre 
parcel. In several parts the Agreement pointed to the specific 
size of the parcel. See Addendum No. 6 in Brief of Appellant 
Gregory. 
The trial court understood that the acreage was an important 
factor in this transaction. Otherwise, the Court would not have 
seen fit to make this finding and he would not have ruled that the 
Grahns should pay for the extra acreage they were receiving through 
reformation. The acreage was important because it was the basis 
for which the property was divided. 
Grahns testified that they wanted the entire property, but 
could not afford the entire piece. The Gregorys therefore agreed 
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to divide the property, and based that decision on the survey they 
had which showed them they could do so and get at least one-half 
acre where they wanted it to the southeast of the driveway. Grahns 
understood that Gregorys division of the property was based upon 
the survey, (See Testimony of Josephine Grahn, Transcript p. 94, 
Lines 8-13 and p. 99 lines 12-19) The Gregorys testified that they 
would not have divided the property had they known that the 
division could not meet those wishes. Therefore the transaction to 
sell Grahns Parcel One would not have ever occurred if Mr. McNeil 
had not made his mistake. The parties were under mistaken 
assumptions based on that erroneous survey when Grahns purchased 
Parcel One. All parties relied on that survey. (See Testimony of 
Josephine Grahn, Transcript p. 97, lines 13-21) Those mistaken 
assumptions were so material, that if known, they would have 
prevented the division of the property and sale to Grahns of Parcel 
One altogether. 
Gregorys' division of the property which made the sale to the 
Grahns possible was based upon a mistaken survey. The parties to 
the sale assumed the survey was correct because without the survey 
the parties could not have divided and sold the property, the 
amount of acreage was material to the transaction. The parcel 
remaining after reformation does not conform with zoning 
requirements, is on a steep hill and is potentially subject to an 
aesthetic easement which further restricts the buildable space on 
the parcel. All of which, Gregory did not intend and resulted from 
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the mistaken survey and was an assumption upon which the division 
of the property was based. All of which are material 
considerations and assumptions upon which the parties relied in 
making their agreement. The underlying survey which created 
parcels 1 and 2 was a material element in negotiating the sale of 
both parcels. The mistaken designation of the size of the parcel 
was central to the parties bargain. The mistake which 
occurred in this case was not a scrivener's or drafter's mistake 
but rather a mistake in the survey which creating the very parcel 
the parties desired to buy and sell. The sale itself was 
accomplished through the mistaken survey and without the mistake in 
the survey the sale would never had occurred. This has a material 
affect upon the agreed exchange of performances and warrants 
rescission under Section 152 of the Restatement 2d of Contracts. 
This Court stated that Gregorys rejected McNeil's tender of a 
revised survey after the mistake was discovered, which included 
one-half acre for parcel 2 and used the road as the boundaries. 
They did so for more reasons than merely because Bradshaws could 
not build the home they had designed on the property. Gregorys 
rejected the revised survey because the zoning commission required 
one-half acre to build and the land which McNeil needed to include 
in the revised survey to get one-half acre did not add to the 
buildable space and would be useless because it was land which 
would be too steep or narrow to build on. Moreover, the division 
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of the property in the revised survey was not the Trust's intention 
and the Trust would not have divided the property that way. 
Gregorys' concern with acreage is clear and logical and they 
carried the burden in this regard with the trial court. They 
simply would not have intended to convey to Grahns part of the 
acreage from what they understood was Parcel Two. 
POINT II 
THE COURT HAS MISUNDERSTOOD THE FACTS 
IN FINDING THAT THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
ON GRAHNS' EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
WAS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PHYSICAL 
STAKED BOUNDARIES OF PARCEL ONE 
This Court found that (1) the Recorder's Office apparently 
used the Danielson deed on parcel two as a basis for the legal 
description for parcel one, that (2) as a result of the mistake of 
the original survey, the Recorder's legal description of parcel one 
was not in conformity with the physical staked boundaries of parcel 
one, and (3) that they legal description on the Grahn's Earnest 
Money Agreement and Deed were different. This Court has 
misunderstood the facts. The physical staked boundaries on parcel 
one at the time the Grahns and Gregorys negotiated the sale of 
Parcel One had been placed there by Mr. McNeil and were based upon 
his erroneous survey. The legal description on the Danielson deed 
for Parcel 2 was also based upon that same survey. Therefore, if 
the Recorder used the Danielson deed as a basis to create the legal 
description for Parcel One, the legal description did have to 
conform with the physical staked boundaries since they were all 
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based upon the same erroneous survey. McNeil's error was 
incorporated into the placement of the physical boundary stakes, it 
was incorporated into the negotiations for sale of both parcels, 
and it was incorporated into the legal descriptions on both deeds. 
The difference between the legal descriptions attached to the 
Grahns' Earnest Money Agreement and their Deed were minor and 
immaterial to this lawsuit* 
Since the parties relied on the boundary stakes and on the 
survey when they entered into their transaction, they were under 
mistaken assumptions about the division of the property and the 
correspondent boundaries. Their understanding and intentions in 
negotiating this sale were all made while under these mistaken 
assumptions, and the sale would not have been made at all had the 
Gregorys known that the division of the property did not conform to 
all their intentions. 
POINT III 
THE REMEDY OF RESCISSION ALLOWS THE 
GRAHNS TO KEEP THE PROPERTY THEY PURCHASED 
OR TO RESCIND THEIR CONTRACT 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 describes the 
situation where a party may rescind an agreement based upon a 
mutual mistake of fact: "Where a mistake of both parties at the 
time the contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made and has a material affect on the agreed exchange 
of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected 
party unless he bears the risk of the mistake. . . " Utah courts have 
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adopted the RESTATEMENT position. See Mooney v. G.R. and 
Associates, 746 P.2d 1174, 1179, (Ut. App. 1987). Kiahtipes v. 
Mills, 649 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah 1982), Renner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 262, 
264-265 (Ariz. 1986). See also Tanner v. District of Judges of the 
Third Judicial District Court, 649 P.2d 5 (Utah 1982). 
The remedy of rescission would not force the Grahns out of 
their property. It would only give them the option to rescind or 
remain in the property with an amended access. The Appellants 
concur with this Court that it would be harsh to force the Grahns 
to abandon their property after they have expended so much time and 
money in improvements. It is undisputed that the Grahns had not 
sold their existing house or moved into the house on Brookburn Road 
until after they learned of the mistake. The Appellants do not 
wish that the Grahns give up the property. They only wish the 
Court to rule that the Grahns either take what they actually 
purchased, the 1.1 acre lot, or rescind their contract. 
Unfortunately to keep the property, would involve the Grahns' 
having to move the driveway onto their property. But this seems to 
be the easiest and most equitable remedy to this difficult 
situation. With this result the Grahns can keep their property, 
Bradshaws can build their home and Gregorys can enforce both 
agreements they made. This was a case of mutual mistake by the 
parties while bargaining, about the nature of the property which 
was the subject of their contract. It warrants a remedy of 
rescission. Under that remedy, the party who was injured by the 
mistake - the Grahns - would have the right to rescind their 
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contract or to keep what they actually received - the 1.1 acre 
parcel of land, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_ day of November, 1990. 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER 
& SWINTON, <P.C. 
wbodbury 
Atj^ cW:A^ y/for Defendants/Appell^ts 
Gregory 
//%^xx^n/^ 
Russell S. Walker 
Attorney for Appellants Bradshaw 
CERTIFICATION BY COUNSEL 
Counsel hereby certifies that the foregoing Petition is not 
being brought in bad faith or for delay, but is brought on the 
grounds that the Appellants believe the Court has misunderstood 
and/or overlooked important facts and law which, if correctly 
understood or addressed, would have resulted in a different 
decision by the Court. 
Dated this 7 day of November, 1990. 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON 
LL 
."^ Woodbury 
or Appellc f ants Gregory 
Russell S. Walker 
Attorney for Appellants Bradshaw 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 1990, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing, PETITION FOR 
REHEARING, to be mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
John S. Adams 
Robert M. Taylor 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Allen Sims, Esq, 
ALLEN SIMS, P.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
J:\JKW\GREGORY.N07 
10 
